The policy can however not be in favour of the sellers due to the fact that they had probably purchased at some higher value but they are obliged to sell at the price set by the government thereby making them to incur heavy losses (Roedy, 2011). if the government want to purchase or rather import cocoa at price, P1=1/2 , The total cost of importing the commodity will be the product of the buying price and the quantity that the customers want and are willing to purchase in the market. This is the commodity needed at the price of Pa=1 which is 4. Therefore the cost incurred is found as shown below: From the behavior of the politician, it can be noted that the behaviour is not for someone who can be trusted and by the politician is no too bad to trust. This is because there is a benefit of doubt on the behaviour of the politician. In rating the politician using Bayes Theorem, she can be at a scale of 0.5 that is top man she is Not Too Bad (NTB). This is because the politician can be so vocal and forget the secrecy and confidentiality of the issue at the same time she may be very cautious to protect the deal that we stroke. Random behaviour in the politician is quite unpredictable and trusting her to infinity definitely is not possible (Griffin, and Moorhead, 2011). in the game, there are various motivational factors that ate referred to as the incentive compatibility. It begins from the pint that the wage is there whether the agent rejects or accepts the contract. This is a reason that makes one to be so hard working in order to get the additional bonus besides the known wage. Incentive compatibility is on the exertion of high efforts by the agent because here again the agent is rest assured of higher returns from the efforts with the aim to make the project by the principal quite successful (Bechet, 2008). from the game, it can be said that the agent can only work harder and exert high pressure after the acceptance of the contract. The wage is there whether the project is successful or not but the bonus depends on the efforts of the agent. From the game therefore, it can be seen that the wages for the agent is (w+b) (Andersen, 2009) when p is close to 0, it can be clearly noted and seen that the bonus is likely to go higher. This therefore means that the two variables are indirectly related and one variable affects the other indirectly. Whenever P=1, it can be clearly seen that the bonus comes to zero
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