Before the commencement of the Operation Iraqi Freedom, the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), an military technical adventure operated by the “Defense Intelligence Agency” (DIA) launched a “Ballistic Missile Portal” (BMP) that would collect “pictures, descriptions, order of battle, infrastructure, technical parameters, and signatures unique to ballistic missiles”2. The whole service Community, including both the expert agents and the fighters in the battlefield, provided data to the BMP, which enabled the operators at the Central Command to locate and hit the threatening targets effectively.In response to the Intelligence personnel’s requirements for quick and the best possible flawless assessments of the possible Iraqi counter actions and strike, DIA authority built a “RED CELL” in order to replicate the decision-making process of the Iraqi military high command. The cell prepared about twenty policy papers that reflected different aspects and functioning processes of the Iraqi high command3. The series of Intelligence effort exerted a direct and effective impact on the US-led Coalition’s forces’ strategic invasion planning and policy making. In an all-inclusive effort to provide support to the Intelligence community prepared a list of 3000 Iraqi personalities including the 55 most wanted who were classified according to their level of posing threat to the US-led coalition. Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) formed a team of 12 analysts and on-battle foreign resource utilization specialists from DIAs MSIC, called the “Joint Captured Materiel Exploitation Cell (JCMEC)”. The JCMEC team played a crucial role in locating, collecting, assessing, utilizing, and evacuating the “captured enemy materiel and weapons of strategic or intelligence value throughout the Iraqi theater of operations”4. ONI’s effort not only fed a swiftly moving army with easily acquired military supply, but also it was cost-effective for the military planners. The ONI experts investigated, located, and packed more than 150 tons of “armored vehicles, torpedoes, naval mines, and anti-ship cruise missiles” for transshipment to the United States5. Various Intelligence agencies were engaged in tackling subsidiary reactions to the Operation Iraqi Freedom. The Iraq Survey Group (ISG) provided important investigative support to the Special Forces for
Bradley, Carl M., “Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance in Support of Operation Iraqi Freedom”, p. 2, October 28, 2011, available at http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA422709
CIA Report, “Support to Operation Iraqi Freedom”, October 28, 2011, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/archived-reports-1/Ann_Rpt_2003/iraq.html
Dale, Catherine. Operation Iraqi Freedom: Strategies, Approaches, Results, and Issues for Congress. October 28, 2011, available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34387.pdf
Knights, Michael. “Iraqi Freedom’ Displays the Transformation of US Air Power,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, v. 15, no. 5 (2003): 16-19.
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